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Today (14 July 2020) is the 101^st birth anniversary of Sagat Singh (14 july 1919- 26 September 2001). He had nothing to do with HFM, but I am discussing him today. why ? Because I think that he deserves to be known to all of us. His name should occupy a pride of place among the great sons of India.

Sagat Singh started his military career in pre independence era as a JCO (Naik) with Bikaner Ganga Risala (army of the riyasat of Bikaner). Later he was promoted as Naib Sebedar and then as second lieutenant.

On amalgamation of the State Forces into Indian Army in 1950 after independence, he joined Third Gorkha Rifles of Indian Army. He commanded the Second and Third Battalions of the Third Gorkha Rifles.

In September 1961, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier and he was posted as the brigade commander of India’s only parachute brigade, the 50^th Parachute Brigade. Most army officers would scoff at joining Parachute brigade, but Sagat Singh joined it enthusiastically and became a paratrooper himself.

Goa liberation war 1961
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The first memorable event in Sagat Singh’s career came in december 1961 which was liberation of Goa. Though India had become independent on 15 August 1947, Goa continued to be under Portugal occupation. Portugal refused to leave Goa, claiming that Goa was not a colony but part of metropolitan Portugal and hence its transfer to India was non-negotiable, and that India had no rights to this territory because the Republic of India did not exist at the time when Goa came under Portuguese rule.

The public opinion in Goa was to join India, but these movements were being forcibly suppressed by Portuguese authorities. The relations between Goa and India became tense. On 24 November 1961, Sabarmati, a passenger boat passing between the Indian port of Kochi and the Portuguese-held island of Anjidiv, was fired upon by Portuguese ground troops, resulting in the death of a passenger and injuries to the chief engineer. The action was precipitated by Portuguese fears that the boat carried a military landing party intent on storming the island. The incidents lent themselves to fostering widespread public support in India for military action in Goa.

On receiving the go-ahead for military action and a mandate for the capture of all occupied territories for the Indian government, Lieutenant-General Chaudhari of the Indian Army’s Southern Command fielded the 17^th Infantry Division commanded by Major-General K. P. Candeth and the 50^th Parachute Brigade commanded by Brigadier Sagat Singh.

The operation for the liberation of Goa, code named ‘Vijay’, was planned for 14 December, 1961. In order to prevent international intervention, and reinforcements from Portugal reaching Goa, it was essential that the operation was quick, and decisive. After a quick appreciation, Chaudhury decided to mount a two pronged attack. The main force, comprising 17 Infantry Division, was to move into Goa from the East, while 50 Parachute Brigade, under Brigadier Sagat Singh, was to mount a subsidiary thrust from the North. Major General K.P. Candeth, GOC 17 Infantry Division, was placed in overall command of the task force.

It was decided during their meeting in Delhi that 2 Para battalion of 50 para brigade would be air dropped by Air force in Goa. But airforce later backed off and this plan had to be abandoned. This 2 para moved to Belgaum where it was met by 1 para of 50 para brigade. 2 Sikh Light infantry (based at Madras) also joined them. They along with 7^th cavalry and 8^th cavalty were also put under the command of Sagat Singh. So in summary, Sagat Singh commanded 50^th Para Brigade, which had as its units 1^st para battalion, 2^nd Para battalion, 2 Sikh Light Infantry battalion, 7^th Light cavalry and 8^th light cavalry.

The brigade moved to Savantvadi on 13 December, and thence to its assembly area East of Dodamarg on the 16^th. Meanwhile, 17 Infantry Division had also commenced its move from Ambala on 2 December, and had concentrated in Belgaum by 12 December. A tactical headquarters was established by HQ Southern Command at Belgaum on 13 December, and the Army Commander with his staff began to function from here. D Day for the operation was initially decided as 14 December, but was later postponed, due to political reasons, in an attempt to avert the conflict, and resolve the problem by diplomatic means. It was finally decided that the operation would commence on the night of 18 December.

Three days before D Day, the COAS, General P.N. Thapar, accompanied by Lieut General P.P. Kumaramangalam, the Adjutant General, and Lieut General J.N. Chaudhury, the Army Commander, visited the brigade, and Sagat presented his plan for the operation. At the end of the presentation, the Army Commander expressed the view that Sagat’s timings were too optimistic, and had reservations about them being adhered to. Sagat then gave the timings in writing, and the party left, after wishing the brigade good luck. On return to his tactical HQ, the Army Commander conveyed his doubts to his staff. However, Air Vice Marshal Pinto, and the Chief of Staff, Major General P.O. Dunn, as well as Mr. G.N. Handoo, of the IB, who knew Sagat well, supported him, and he was allowed to proceed according to his plan. As it happened, Sagat had already kept a reserve of four hours, and was able to remain well ahead of the estimated timings, when the operations took place.

50 Parachute Brigade had been given a subsidiary task, of advancing from the North, primarily to tie down the Portuguese troops in that area. However, Sagat was not the type to be shackled by rigid orders, and had already visualised a larger role for himself. He had decided to move on a wide front on two axes, with a vehicle mounted battalion group on each, supported by armour and artillery. He reasoned that if he was held up on one axis, he would continue the advance on the other, and using the reserve battalion, advance deeper into Goa, either through Bicholim-Mapuca-Panjim Creek, or via Sanquelim-Usgaon-Ponda-Velha Goa, on to Panjim. 2 Sikh Light Infantry group, supported by a squadron of 7th Cavalry and a troop ex 8 Cavalry, was tasked to advance on the Bicholim axis. 2 Para, supported by rest of 7^th Cavalry and a troop ex 8^th Cavalry, was assigned the Sanquelim axis. 1 Para was kept in reserve.

Though the operation was to commence on the night of 18 December, Sagat had decided to launch fighting patrols the previous night, to overcome the border outposts, in order to facilitate the entry of the main column across the border the following morning. Accordingly, Sagat had tasked 1 Para to capture two border outposts, and 2 Para to proceed along the ‘smugglers route’ and capture the single span 110 feet long bridge over the Sanquelim river, on the previous night. As these preliminary operations were going on, All India Radio gave the game away, by announcing shortly after midnight, that Indian troops were crossing into Goa. This alerted the Portuguese, and the element of surprise, so important in such operations, was lost. One company of 2 Para, after a swift night approach, had reached within 200 yards of the bridge, when barking dogs alerted the defending troops, who quickly fired the demolitions and fled.

The Portuguese Governor General and C-in-C, Major General Vassalo De Silva, was from the Corps of Engineers, and had got demolition chambers made in all the bridges, with explosives attached, for rapid demolitions. However, the company of 2 Para found a crossing place, and secured the home bank, enabling the tanks, guns and vehicles to cross the river. The Portuguese had not been able to fire all the demolition charges, and only those at the two ends had exploded. The single span had fallen down but was undamaged. Using marine jacks, the span was lifted, and with the addition of abutments at both ends, the bridge was soon re-commissioned. 1 Para also managed to capture the villages of Ibrampur, Maulinguem and Doromaoga, by first light of 18 December, though it suffered some casualties.

The main force, viz 17 Infantry Division commenced from its assembly area South of Belgaum, at dawn on 18 December, with 63 Infantry Brigade in the lead. It was planned to advance up to Ponda, by way of Mollem. 48 Infantry Brigade, which was following, was to pass through at Ponda, and go for Panjim, which was the final objective. Due to the advance on foot and abnormally large bridging column which was following the leading brigade, 48 Infantry Brigade could not keep up its advance, and when it reached River Candepar in evening, it found it was already occupied by paratroopers. Two battalions of 50 Parachute Brigade, 2 Para and 2 Sikh LI, had also commenced their advance at first light, on 18 December. Moving on converging axes, they did not let the blown up bridges deter them and simply swam across. The absence of heavy equipment, and light opposition from the enemy, coupled with initiative of the leaders, made this possible. As a result, the para troopers made excellent progress, and achieved more than what was expected from them. By 8.30 a.m. 2 Sikh LI had taken Bicholim and by 10.30 a.m. 2 Para reached Sanquelim, and by 5.30 p.m., occupied Ponda. This was done in spite of two major obstacles, in the form of the rivers Usgaon and Candepar, which were crossed by means of improvised rafts and fording.

After the crossing of the wide Usgaon river, Sagat felt that there was now no need to hold 1 Para in reserve, and he ordered them to head straight for Banasterim, after crossing the ferry at Piligao. According to his initial plan, on reaching Panjim, 2 Para was to establish a firm base close to the city, and 1 Para would be tasked to clear the expected resistance in the built up area. The lack of enemy resistance, and speed of advance had altered the situation. Another development took place at tactical HQ of Southern Command, at Belgaum. A wireless intercept indicated that the Portuguese Governor General had called for a meeting next morning at 8 a.m., to consider surrender. The Army Commander, when informed of this, realised that the Portuguese had lost the battle. Seeing the slow progress of 17 Infantry Division, and the rapid advance of 50 Para Brigade, he decided to change the plan. The task of capturing Panjim, which had been earlier assigned to 17 Division, was now given to the paratroopers, who were asked resume advance during the night. Due to break down in signal communications, this order could not be passed to HQ 17 Infantry Division, which had ordered 50 Para Brigade to firm in at Ponda, and tasked 48 Brigade to capture Panjim. However, Lieut-General Chaudhury personally spoke to the Brigade Major of 50 Para Brigade, and passed these instructions, since Sagat was away from his headquarters, visiting 2 Para, at that time. Incidentally, 50 Para Brigade was able to maintain contact with Belgaum throughout the operation, thanks to a radio relay detachment, which Sagat had managed to get from Major General R.N. Batra, the Signal Officer-in-Chief, on the ‘old boy’ net.

The advance of 2 Sikh LI was initially slow, even though it was led by the squadron of 7 Cavalry, and a troop of AMX tanks. Sagat felt that they had a tendency to hug the ground, and this accounted for their slow progress. He had to personally push them hard, before they speeded up their advance, and reached the Betim ferry, on the Panjim Creek, by last light. By this time, 1 Para had reached the outskirts of Panjim. With two battalions around Panjim by the evening of 18 December, 50 Para Brigade was now poised to capture the town, from the East as well as the North. However, it was almost dark, and Sagat did not want to enter the built up area of Panjim by night. He ordered 1 Para and 2 Sikh LI to halt, and establish harbours, for the night.

On the morning of 19 December, using the Betim ferry, some troops of 2 Sikh LI crossed the Panjim Creek, and arrived in Panjim at 8 am. Shortly afterwards, 1 Para also reached Panjim. Except for some firing from the customs house, there was no effective resistance, and the city was in Indian hands by 9 a.m. By a remarkable coincidence, the COs of both battalions had the same name. 1 Para was being commanded by Lieut Colonel Sucha Singh, VrC, MC, while the CO of 2 Sikh LI was Lieut Colonel Sucha Singh. It was the latter who won the race by an hour, and had the honour of accepting the surrender of the Portuguese troops, who had assembled in the officers mess. Major General Vassalo De’ Silva, the Governor General and C-in-C, escaped to Marmagao, and surrendered later. The Navy had already taken Anjidiv island the previous day, and also sunk the Portuguese frigate ‘Albuquerque’. At 11 a.m., Lieut-General Chaudhury, accompanied by Air Vice Marshal Pinto arrived in a helicopter, and got the tri-colour hoisted on the Secretariat building. Goa had been liberated, in an operation which lasted a little over 24 hours.

So, one can say that Goa was supposed to be liberated by 17^st Infantry Division commanded by Major-General K. P. Candeth, with 50^th. Parachute Brigade commanded by Brigadier Sagat Singh supposed to play a supporting role. But it was the other way round. Sagat Singh’s 50^th Parachute Brigade reached Panjim and accepted surrender of Goan authority, while 17^th Infantry Division was still struggling to reach Panjim.

Though the result of the operations in Goa was along expected lines, the speed of the Indian advance surprised many observers. The credit for this goes to Sagat, and his troops, who exceeded their brief, and managing to reach Panjim, which they had not been asked to do. The fact that 17 Infantry Division, in spite of the vastly superior resources at their disposal, and almost no opposition from the enemy, could make little headway, goes to show that the going was not easy. If the paratroopers succeeded, it was because of better fighting spirit, morale and leadership. The ability to take risks, and seize fleeting opportunities is the hall mark of a successful military leader, and Sagat proved beyond doubt that he had these qualities in ample measure.

Bangladesh Liberation War 1971
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In 1971 war, time was of essence. As soon as Pakistan started the war, on 3 December 1971 (by carrying out what they thought was an Israeli style bombing on Indian airfields), India retaliated and Pakistan ran to the UN on 4 December 1971 (in a very un Israel like manner), requesting UN to intervene and order ceasefire. Pakistan was supported by USA and China, while USSR vetoed the proposal, Britain and France abstained. So, India had limited time in which to achieve their task before Pakistan could manage to get ceasefire, like how they had managed to force India, then on the verge of defeating Pakistan soundly, into ceasefire in 1965, thanks to Chinese aggression at Sikkim.

In 1971, The task of liberating Bangla Desh, then called East Pakistan, was given to Lieut General Jagjit Singh Aurora, GOC-in-C Eastern Command. He had four corps under him, namely- 2 Corps, commanded by Lieut General (later General) T.N. Raina; 33 Corps, commanded by Lieut General M.L. Thapan; 4 Corps, commanded by Lieut General Sagat Singh; and 101 Communication Zone Area, commanded by Major General G.S. Gill.

East Pakistan had three major rivers and that divided it into four major territories. Each of the corps was given the task of capturing one territory each. The part south of river Padma (that is known as Ganga in India) was to be captured by Corps II, advancing from West (viz from West Bengal). The part between Padma (Ganga in India) and Jamuna (known as Brahmputra in India) was to be captured by Corps XXXIII, advancing from North west. Another major river is river Meghna (combination of Barak river and Kushtia river, both originating in Assam), which flows south west and joins Padma (which is already merged with Jamuna by then). The mighty river that thus gets formed is known as Meghna from then onwards and it flows into bay of Bengal. Sagat Singh’s corps 4 was given the task of capturing the territory east of River Meghna, attacking from east. The fourth territory, viz the northern territory between Jamuna and Meghna rivers was to be captured by 101 Communication Zone Area, attacking from north.

Bangladesh is a territory full of rivers. Crossing them is tough because there are very few bridges on them.

Pakistan had three infantry divisions, comprising about 42 battalions of regular troops, and five squadrons of armour, for the defence of the region, and more than 2000 kilometres of border. Lieut General A.A.K. Niazi, who was commanding the Eastern Command of the Pakistan Army, had appreciated that the Indian advance would have to be along the major road axes, and had deployed his troops accordingly. Strong points had been created along the likely axes, and it was visualised that unless these were cleared, the advancing enemy could make little headway.

Lt General Niazi’s hunch was correct as far as corps II, corps XXXIII and 101 communication zone were concerned. They advanced in the conventional way along the predicted route where Pakistani forces awaited them. Fighting them and defeating them consumed precious time of these corps of Indian Army. As a result, these corps fell way behind schedule in achieving their targets. Time was important because the longer the war prolonged, more was the possibility that UN would force a ceasefire and like in 1965, it would end up in a stalemate, with nothing to show for by India.

Just when it looked gloomy for Indian forces, Sagat Singh employed some unconventional strategies that no military strategist had ever thought of. Realising that time was important and using the same conventional method of advancing on land was time consuming, he decided to air drop his troops across river Meghna. He had antique helicopters which were not meant for this purpose, but he made them fly hundreds of sorties, and in each sortie 17 troops were carried (about 5 more than the carrying capacity). It was a risky gamble, and these helicopters were shot at by Pakistani troops. On one occasion, one helicopter was hit by these shots. The bullets hit the pilot and grazed past Sagat Singh, also flying in the helicopter. Sagat Singh was playing for broke, and his gamble paid off big time.

When his Corps had reached the Meghna River and he was trying to cross the river to advance to Dacca, Aurora tried to restrain him. Sagat told him that he was surprised at his reluctance when he was not only fulfilling the task given to him but achieving task plus. Hesuccessfully conducted an ad hoc and impromptu river crossing operation across one of the widest rivers of the world.

The air lift began on the afternoon of December 9, and continued for the next 36 hours. A total of 110 sorties were flown, from a stadium, and crossed the Meghna, which was 4,000 yards wide, to land at helipads which had been marked by torches, with their reflectors removed. During day, the troops were landed in paddy fields, with helicopters hovering low above the ground. The first battalion of 311 Mountain Brigade, 4 Guards, was landed in Raipura. while 9 Punjab crossed the river using country boats.

Next day, the troops were landed directly at Narsingdi. Meanwhile, 73 Brigade had started to cross, using boats, which had been rounded up. The ferrying of artillery and tanks was a serious problem, and required considerable ingenuity on the part of the Engineers. By 11 December, both 311 and 73 Mountain Brigade had crossed the Meghna, and were ordered to advance to Dacca, on different axes. Using all modes of transport, including bullock carts and cycle rickshaws, both brigades advanced rapidly, and on December 14, the first artillery shell was fired on Dacca. Meanwhile, 101 communication zone too advanced towards Dacca from north. This, as well as other units that began arriving towards Dhaka were put under the command of Sagat Singh on 15 December. Shelling commenced and the message for Pakistan Army was clear, surrender or perish. One way or the other, Dacca was bound to fall to Indian forces on 16 December 1971.

Niazi surrendered on 16 december 1971. Unlike in 1965, when Pakistan avoided a humiliating defeat, this time, Pakistan could not save face. On 12 December, with Pakistan facing imminent defeat, the United States requested that the Security Council be reconvened. Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was rushed to New York City to make the case for a resolution on the cease fire. The council continued deliberations for four days. By the time proposals were finalised, Pakistan’s forces in the East had surrendered and the war had ended, making the measures merely academic. Bhutto, frustrated by the failure of the resolution and the inaction of the United Nations, ripped up his speech and left the council. 🙂

So, Sagat Singh’s unconventional tactics bamboozled Pakistani army and Pakistani rulers alike. Pakistan was forced to surrender several days before than they had expected. Some “experts” thought that Niazi should have deferred his decision by another one day. But these experts forget that Niazi had no choice. There was no way he would have left Dacca alive without Indian forces’ protection. Even if there was ceasefire, Indian troops would have just handed him over to Mukti Bahini. So surrendering before Indian army was an offer that Niazi could not refuse. 🙂

Here is that famous surrender photo. Sagat Singh is seen standing immediately behind Niazi.

So, one can see that Sagat Singh caused liberation of Goa on 19 december 1961 and liberation of Bangladesh on 16 december 1971. It was almost a “ten year liberation challenge” (dec 1961-dec 1971) as far as he was concerned ! 🙂

But, neither of these two feats were the biggest achievements of his career, in my opinion. His biggest achievement, in my opinion, that had far reaching implications for India, and therefore world affairs, came about in 1967 and ironically, very few people know about it and even talk about it. and that was :-

1967 India China War
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I have mentioned it earlier that India was winning against Pakistan decisively in 1965 when China, in a bid to save Pakistan, opened a front at Sikkim, and accused India of provocation and made some unreasonable demands on India. Indian government got nervous and declared ceasefire when on the verge of victory against Pakistan. This saved Pakistan big time. On the negotiating table, Pakistan got back everything that it had lost in the war. India not only surrendered all the gains of the war, even its PM Lal Bahadur Shashtri died mysteriously at Tashkant, where this meeting was taking place. So to many Indians it felt as if the entire world ganged up against India and India was stabbed in the back for the misdeed of Pakistan and Pakistan got away scot free.

Among the threats made by China while opening the Sikkim front with India, was the unreasonable demand that India vacated the two passes that were under Indian occupation, claiming that they were Chinese territories. These passes were Nathu La pass and Jelep La pass.

Nathu La was under mountain division 17 (headed by its Division Commander Major General Sagat Singh) while Jelep La was under mountain division 27 (headed by another Major General ). Both were under Lt Gen G G Bewoor, Corps commander of corps XXXIII.

In the opinion of Corps Commander Lt Gen Bewoor, the main defences of 17 Mountain Division were at Changgu, while Nathu La was only an observation post. Likewise In the adjoining sector, manned by 27 Mountain Division, Jelep La was also considered an observation post, with the main defences located at Lungthu. In case of hostilities, the divisional commanders had been given the authority to vacate the posts, and fall back on the main defences. Accordingly, orders were issued by Corps HQ to both divisions to vacate Nathu La and Jelep La.

Sagat did not agree with the views of the Corps HQ. Nathu La and Jelep La were passes, on the watershed, which was the natural boundary. The MacMahon Line, which India claimed as the International Border, followed the water shed principle, and India and China had gone to war over this issue, three years earlier. Vacating the passes on the watershed would give the Chinese the tactical advantage of observation and fire, into India, while denying the same to our own troops. Nathu La and Jelep La were also important because they were on the trade routes between India and Tibet, and provided the only means of ingress through the Chumbi Valley. Handing it over to the enemy on a platter was not Sagat’s idea of sound military strategy. Sagat also reasoned that the discretion to vacate the posts lay with the divisional commander, and he was not obliged to do so, based on instructions from Corps HQ.

As a result of orders issued by Corps HQ, 27 Mountain Division vacated Jelep La, which the Chinese promptly occupied. However, Sagat refused to vacate Nathu La, and when the Chinese became belligerent, and opened fire, he also opened up with guns and mortars, though there was a restriction imposed by Corps on the use of artillery. Lieut-General (later General) G.G. Bewoor, the Corps Commander, was extremely annoyed, and tried to speak to Sagat, to ask him to explain his actions. But Sagat was not in his HQ, and was with the forward troops. So it was his GSO 1, Lieut Colonel Lakhpat Singh, who bore the brunt of the Corps Commander’s wrath.

The Chinese had installed loudspeakers at Nathu La, and warned the Indians that they would suffer as they did in 1962, if they did not withdraw. However, Sagat had carried out a detailed appreciation of the situation, and reached the conclusion that the Chinese were bluffing. They made threatening postures, such as advancing in large numbers, but on reaching the border, always stopped, turned about and withdrew. They also did not use any artillery, for covering fire, which they would have certainly done if they were serious about capturing any Indian positions. Indian defences at Nathu La were strong. Sagat had put artillery observation posts on adjoining high features called Camel’s Back and Sebu La, which overlooked into the Yatung valley for several kilometres, and could bring down accurate fire on the enemy, an advantage that the Chinese did not have. It would be a tactical blunder to vacate Nathu La, and gift it to the Chinese.

During the crisis, the Chinese had occupied Jelep La, but had gained nothing in the sector under Sagat’s division. This was galling for them, and they continued their pressure on the Indians, and making threatening gestures. In December 1965, the Chinese fired on a patrol of 17 Assam Rifles, in North Sikkim, at a height of 16,000 feet, killing two men. The patrol was in Indian territory, but the Chinese claimed that it had crossed over to their side. They made regular broadcasts from loudspeakers at Nathu La, pointing out to Indian troops the pathetic conditions in which they lived, their low salaries and lack of amenities, comparing these to that of officers. It was a form of psychological warfare in which the Chinese were adept, and had to be countered. Sagat had similar loud speakers installed on our own side, and tape recorded messages, in Chinese language, were broadcast every day. However, he was not satisfied with this, and kept looking for a chance to avenge the death of the Indian soldiers who had fallen to Chinese bullets.

Throughout 1966, and early 1967, Chinese propaganda, intimidation and attempted incursions into Indian territory continued. The border was not marked, and there were several vantage points on the crest line which both sides thought belonged to them. Patrols which walked along the border often clashed, resulting in tension, and sometimes even casualties.

In 1967, Sagat discussed the problem with the new Corps Commander, Lieut General J.S. Aurora. He suggested that the border at Nathu La should be clearly marked, to prevent such incidents, and offered to walk along the crest line, to test the Chinese resolve. If they did not object, the line along which he walked could be taken to be acceptable to them. This was agreed to, and Sagat, accompanied by an escort, began walking along the crest. The Chinese commander also walked alongside, accompanied by a photographer, who kept taking pictures. However, there was no confrontation, and the ‘walk’ ended peacefully.

Sagat then obtained the concurrence of the Corps Commander to mark the crest line, along which he had walked. He ordered a double wire fence to be erected, from Nathu La towards the North and South Shoulders. However, as soon as work began on the fence, on 20 August 1967, the Chinese became agitated, and asked the Indians to stop. One strand of wire was laid that day, and two more were added over the next two days. On 6 September, a patrol of 2 Grenadiers, the battalion which was holding defences at Nathula, was going towards the South Shoulder, when it was surrounded by about seventy Chinese, and threatened. The next day, the Chinese physically tried to interfere with the construction of the fence, and there was a scuffle. However, work continued on the next two days, and was almost completed on the 10th.

Since the Chinese appeared determined to prevent completion of the fence, it was decided to start early on 11th, and finish the job before first light. All available manpower, including a platoon of Engineers and another of Pioneers, was deployed for the task. A company of 18 Rajput was also brought in, to reinforce the position, and protect the men who were to construct the fence. As soon as work commenced, the Chinese came upto the fence, and tried to stop the work. There was a heated discussion between the Chinese commander, who was accompanied by the political commissar, and Lieut Colonel Rai Singh, CO 2 Grenadiers. Sagat had foreseen this eventuality, and told Lieut Colonel Rai Singh not to expose himself, and remain in his bunker, where the Brigade Commander, Brigadier M.M.S. Bakshi, was also present. But this was not heeded, and the CO, with an escort, came out in the open, to stand face to face with the Chinese officers. As the arguments became more heated, tempers rose, but both sides stood their ground. Suddenly, the Chinese opened fire, causing several casualties among the troops working on the wire fence. Lieut Colonel Rai Singh was hit by a Chinese bullet, and fell down.

Seeing their CO fall, the Grenadiers became mad with rage. In a fit of fury, they came out of their trenches, and attacked the Chinese post, led by Captain P.S. Dagar. The company of 18 Rajput, under Major Harbhajan Singh, and the Engineers working on the fence had been caught in the open, and suffered a few casualties from the Chinese firing. Realising that the only way to neutralise the Chinese fire was a physical assault, Harbhajan shouted to his men, and led them in a charge on the Chinese position. Several of the Indian troops were mowed down, by Chinese machine guns, but those who reached the Chinese bunkers used their bayonets, and accounted for many of the enemy. Both Harbhajan and Dagar lost their lives in the action, which developed into a full scale battle, lasting three days. Sagat had asked for some medium guns, and these were moved up to Kyangnosa La, at a height of over 10,000 ft.

Those day, authority to use artillery was only with Army Chief. Sagat Singh asked for permission to use artillery. His commanding officer sent the request to Delhi where the request went tthrough various channels in a proper bureaucratic manner. Seeing that it would be too late if he kept waiting for the orders from Delhi, Sagat Singh ordered firing of artillery on his own.

The artillery observation posts, which Sagat had sited earlier, proved their worth in bringing down effective fire on the Chinese. Because of lack of visibility, and the steep incline West of Nathu La, most Chinese shells fell behind the forward defences, and did not harm the Indians. Indian artillery shelling caused heavy damage on Chinese. Based on their observation of meek Indian behaviour so far, Chinese forces had never expected such a furious response.

The Indian casualties in the action were just over two hundred – 65 dead and 145 wounded. The Chinese are estimated to have suffered about three hundred casualties. Though the action taken by Sagat, in marking the border with a wire fence, had the approval of higher authorities, the large number of casualties suffered by both sides created a furore. The casualties to Indian troops would not have occurred if they had remained in their defences, and not exposed themselves by coming out of their trenches and rushing at the Chinese post. This happened in the heat of the moment, because seeing their CO fall, the troops lost their cool, and rushed forward under the orders of a young officer, who lost his life in the action.

The Corps Commander, Lieut General J.S. Aurora, visited Nathu La, to assess the situation. Sagat was advised to prevent further escalation of hostilities, and avoid casualties to Indian troops.

The Chinese had already announced that it was the Indians who started the conflict, and the large number of Indian bodies, and wounded Indian soldiers, in their possession, seemed to support their claim. However, Sagat was not perturbed. For the last two years, the Chinese had been instigating him, and had killed several Indian soldiers. The specter of Chinese attack, of 1962, still haunted the military and political leadership in India and had prevented them from taking effective action against them. This was the first time the Chinese got a bloody nose, and the myth of their invincibility was broken.

This was not the end of the face-off with the Chinese. They had suffered more than 300 casualties and seemed unwilling to let the watershed cool down. On 1 Oct, a confrontation ensued between the Chinese and 7/11 Gorkha Regiment at Chola, a pass west of Nathu La and under the responsibility of 63 Brigade. The Gorkhas had that very day taken over the post at Pt 15450 from 10 J&K Rifles. A scuffle ensued between the JCO post commander and his Chinese counterpart over a boulder which was on the watershed. The Chinese bayoneted the JCO and his men retaliated with the deadly use of the khukhri. A fierce hand to hand struggle ensued and a neighbouring post came under attack. The Gorkhas were unwilling to start their tenure with a defeat and got clearance from the Brigade Commander to raise the stakes. Pt 15450, which had been taken by the Chinese, was vigorously attacked with close quarter khukhri work and the Chinese were evicted. This was a clear signal to them that the Indians would not surrender an inch of territory and the area around the watershed stabilised, ultimately being designated as the Line of Actual Control.

These two incidents were so unexpected and demoralising for the Chinese that there has been no firing on the LAC from that time in 1967 till today (2020). They kept threatening Indian even later, but the mental scars left on them in 1967 have not healed. That has acted as a brake on Chinese aggression.

Had India surrendered Nathu La under pressure of China then China would have had a free passage to Sikkim (then an Indian protectorate). China would have occupied Sikkim in no time. From Sikkim, cutting off Indian North East through Siliguri Corridor (aka Chicken neck) would have been a piece of cake for China. Occupying Sikkim would have enabled them to occupy the entire North East part of India. And all that before 1970. So there would have been no Bangladesh war and no win for India in that war. All this was avoided just because India had the right man at the right time as the incharge of protecting the borders at Nathu La during 1965 to 1967. And he took a decision in national interest that was at variance with the decision of his superior. Obeying that wrong decision cost India Jelep La pass, but Sagat Singh ensured that he would not surrender Nathu La. And two years later, he gave China a bloody nose, once again, by taking a decision that was against rules but in national interest.

His feat at Nathu La has been downplayed and its long term significance in ensuring the morale of Indian armed forces, and also in ensuring the unity and integrity of the nation, has not been fully appreciated.

During 1971 war, China did not interfere by opening another front, unlike what they had done in 1965. For that India must be thankful to Sagat Singh. The bloody nose that Chinese had received in 1967 was only too fresh in Chinese minds, so they stayed out of this conflict even though China Sikkim border was quite close to the war zone in East Pakistan !

One army officer, who has followed his career closely rightly observed that Sagat Singh was one of the greatest army commanders of all times. He is comparable to German Army commander Rommel and US army commander George Patten. Like Patten, Sagat Singh too found his war expoits being overlooked by his superiors, but Sagat Singh would not let that stop him from giving his best for the nation.

Just as this episode of Indian forces giving China a bloody nose in 1967 has been carefully shoved under the carpet, even Hindi movies have not covered this glorious chapter of Indian Army. Or so I thought. I came to know a few months back that a movie “Paltan”(2018) has been made on this event. But unlike other war movies, few moviegoers seem to have watched it. The movie seemingly flopped, which is a great pity.

The movie is available on zee5, and I especially subscribed to zee5 to watch this movie. The movie was directed by J P Datta. It had Jackie Shroff, Arjun Rampal, Sonu Sood, Harshvardhan Rane, Esha Gupta, Sonal Chauhan etc in it. Jackie Shroff plays Sagat Singh in the movie.

Here is a song from “Paltan” (2018) in honour of Late Lt Gen (Retd)Sagat Singh, the hero of Goa Liberation war, Bangladesh liberation war and the person who gave Indians the belief that Chinese armymen were not invincible, unlike what we were told since 1962.

The song is sung by Khuda Baksh, Irfan I, Adarsh II and Divya Kumar. Jawed Akhtar is the lyricist. Anu Malik is the music director. Knowing Anu Malik’s reputation, it should come as no surprise if his tunes turn out to be “inspired” tunes. Here it is lifted from the theme music of “The bridge on the river Kwai”.

The picturisation of the song is just two minutes long. The audio version is six minutes long.

Video

Audio full

Song-Paltan o paltan (Paltan)(2018) Singers-Khuda Baksh, Irfan I, Adarsh II, Divya Kumar, Lyrics-Jawed Akhtar, MD-Anu Malik

Lyrics

chale jo apni paltan to parwat hatt jaayein
dariya rasta chhodein chattanein kat jaayein
chale jo apni paltan to parwat hatt jaayein
dariya rasta chhodein chattanein kat jaayein
ik saathi hai daayein
ik sathi hai baayein
ik sathi hai daayein
ik sathi hai baayein
hatein na hum jo kisi morche par datt jaayein
paltan o paltan
paltan o paltan
paltan o paltan
paltan o paltan
tere liye hum laaye hain tann-mann
paltan o paltan
paltan o paltan
vande mataram
vande mataram
vande ae mataram
vande ae mataram

tez nigaahein tez dhadkanein tez kadam hain
hilta hai aakaash bhi jab yoon chalte hum hain
pairon ko chhoone aati hain khud hi raahein
har manzil hai milti humse khole baahein
paltan o paltan
paltan o paltan
paltan o paltan
paltan o paltan
tere liye hum laaye hain tann-mann
paltan o paltan
paltan o paltan
vande mataram
vande mataram
vande ae mataram
vande ae mataram

aangaaron ki baarish ho ya aag ke saagar
hum badhhte hi jaate hain in sab ko o bujhaa kar
josh bhi hai aur hosh bhi hai aur taakat bhi hai
har dushman se takraane ki himmat bhi hai
paltan o paltan
paltan o paltan
paltan o paltan
paltan o paltan
tere liye hum laaye hain tan mann
o sathi o
o sathi o
hum bhi kahen
tum bhi kaho
hum bhi kahen
tum bhi kaho
vande maataram
vande maataram
paltan o paltan
paltan o paltan
vande ae maataram
vandee ae maataram